State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 3, 1988 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
8-3-1988 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from August 3, 1988 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 3, 
1988 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/344 
//2A-8/3/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNATEGO TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3066, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9504 
UNATEGO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
BRIAN A. LAUD, Field Representative, for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQS. (EDWARD SARZYNSKI, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Unatego 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 3 066 
(Association) and the cross-exceptions of the Unatego Central 
School District (District) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) which 
found, in part, that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act). In particular, the 
Director found that the District violated the Act when it 
unilaterally adopted an "Unpaid Leave of Absence" policy but 
dismissed so much of the Association's charge as alleges that 
bargaining unit member Joan Marshall was denied an unpaid leave 
of absence in violation of the past practice in.effect between 
the parties. 
11648 
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It is uncontroverted that on April 29, 1987, the Board of 
Education of the District enacted an unpaid leave of absence 
policy, without negotiation with the Association, which was to 
take effect on July 1, 1987. While the policy was directed 
primarily at short-term unpaid leaves of absence being taken by 
noninstructional staff, it is uncontradicted that the policy 
applies also to long-term unpaid leaves of absence for teaching 
staff. Furthermore, it is established by the record that, during 
the eight-year period preceding the District's enactment of its 
unpaid leave of absence policy, Association bargaining unit 
members made seven requests for long-term unpaid leave and that 
all seven requests were granted by the Board of Education, 
although not always on the basis of a unanimous vote. There is 
no evidence concerning the criteria considered by the Board when 
reviewing and granting these requests. 
Under the policy enacted by the Board of Education on 
April 29, 1987, a new procedure and criteria for requesting 
unpaid leaves were developed. A copy of the policy is annexed 
hereto as Appendix A. 
The Director found that the District's new policy on unpaid 
leaves of absence created not only a new procedure, but also new 
substantive requirements for obtaining such leaves, both of which 
constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Director 
accordingly found that the implementation of the new leave 
i/see City of Albany, 7 PERB [^3078 (1974) ; Spencerport CSD. 16 
PERB 5[3074 (1983); Plainedcre UFSD, 7 PERB f3050 (1974). 
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without pay policy without negotiation with the Association 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. His finding in this regard is 
affirmed. 
The Director also found, however, that the new policy did 
not form the basis for the decision of the Board of Education to 
deny Marshall's leave request, made on May 12, 1987, shortly 
after the Board of Education promulgated it. The Director did so 
based upon a credibility determination of the testimony of 
Superintendent Molatch, that the denial of Marshall's leave 
request was based not upon promulgation of the new leave policy, 
but upon the special circumstances of her request. The reason 
given by the District for the denial of Marshall's request, 
notwithstanding the granting of all previous requests for the 
past eight years, is that she made it known to the Board that the 
reason for the leave request was to take other unrelated 
employment (with the Federal Bureau of Investigation), without 
indicating its temporary nature or an intention to return to her 
employment with the District. A secondary reason offered by the 
District for its refusal of Marshall's leave request was that the 
leave was to take effect on June 1, 1987, before the conclusion 
of the academic year, rather than at the conclusion of the 
academic year, as had been the case with other leave requests. 
Notwithstanding the previous history in the District of 
granting leave requests, we are unwilling to disturb the 
Director's credibility finding leading to dismissal of the charge 
insofar as it relates to Marshall's leave request. Furthermore, 
we affirm the Director's dismissal of this aspect of the charge 
11644 
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upon the ground that the Association failed to meet its burden of 
establishing the existence of a past practice of granting leaves 
under the same circumstances as presented in Marshall's request. 
This is particularly so in view of the absence of evidence in the 
record that the members of the Board of Education who voted upon 
each of the leave requests presented by the Association had any 
knowledge or awareness that any granted leave requests were for 
the purpose of taking other unrelated nontemporary employment. 
Although the Association presented evidence that employee Hurd 
obtained a leave of absence in order to pursue employment with a 
local real estate agency, and that employee Scott obtained a 
leave of absence to pursue other employment in North Carolina, 
there is no evidence that the members of the Board of Education 
were aware of these circumstances when they granted the leave 
requests 2/. In the absence of such evidence, it cannot be said 
that the Association has met its burden of establishing that the 
Board of Education has, by its actions, divested itself of its 
discretion to deny leave requests, and has thus created a 
practice of granting all leave requests upon which unit members 
have come to rely. 
The Association asserts that school principal Hull's 
prediction to Marshall that her leave request would be denied 
constitutes evidence of departure from the past practice of 
granting leaves of absence. However, in the absence of evidence 
•2/Both requests to the Board were based on "personal and family 
reasons." 
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of the reasoning behind the prediction , it may equally be 
inferred that Hull perceived a difference between Marshall's 
circumstances and those of others whose requests had been 
granted. Of particular note is the fact that Marshall did not 
express any intention of returning to her employment with the 
District, nor did she indicate that the employment was for a 
trial period or that she would be undergoing a probationary or 
training period which might result in her return to employment 
with the District. The evidence, accordingly, adequately 
supports the Director's determination that Marshall's request may 
be distinguished from other requests which had previously been 
granted. 
Based upon the limited factual circumstances of this case, 
the Director's dismissal of so much of the charge as alleges that 
Marshall's leave request was denied in violation of §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Act is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the unpaid leave of absence policy adopted by 
the Board of Education on April 29, 1987, as it affects 
employees in the unit represented by the Unatego 
Teachers Association; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Unatego Teachers 
Association with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees; and 
11646 
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3. Post a notice in the form attached in all locations 
ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
^S- /C <^^<< 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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APPENDIX A 
"- -; It is recognized that unexpected or emergency 
circumstances may arise which would cause an employee to 
request an unpaid personal leave of absence for a day or 
more. An unpaid personal leave of absence is designed 
for use only when emergency or unforeseen extenuating 
circumstances arise which would necessitate an 
employee's absence for a purpose which cannot be 
scheduled for another time. An unpaid personal leave of 
absence may not be used for the purpose of extending a 
holiday, for a vacation, for recreation or pleasure, or 
- for any^purpose £or^ _which_another_ categoryi_Qf_leav_e—is 
available. 
The employee's request for an unpaid personal leave of 
absence must be submitted to the Superintendent, through 
the employee's immediate supervisor, at least two weeks 
prior to the desired commencement date of the absence. 
The advance request requirement may only be waived by 
the Superintendent. The request must clearly indicate 
the desired date(s) of the leave, the purpose of the 
leave, and any extenuating circumstances that exist 
which form the basis for the request. 
Only the Superintendent is authorized to grant approval 
for an unpaid personal leave of absence. Each request 
'"'") will be considered on its own merits. Such factors as 
'• -
/
 the need for and the availability of a qualified and 
competent substitute, the importance of the functions 
normally performed by the employee during the requested 
period of absence, the degree of disruption anticipated 
as a result of the employee's absence, the cost to the 
District and any impact on the daily operations of the 
District will be considered in each case, as well as any 
factors unique to the particular case. 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the 
Unatego Teachers Association, NYSUT. AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 3066, 
that the Unatego Central School District: 
1. Will rescind the unpaid leave of absence policy 
adopted by the Board of Education on April 29, 1987, 
as it affects employees in the unit represented by 
the Unatego Teachers Association, and 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with the Unatego 
Teachers Association with respect to terms and 
conditions of employment of unit employees. 
UNATEGO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER POLICE LOCUST CLUB, INC. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9665 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
JESSERER & ANDOLINA, ESQS. (LAWRENCE J. ANDOLINA, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
LOUIS N. KASH, ESQ., (BARRY C. WATKINS, ESQ, of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Rochester (City) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
decision which sustains a charge by the Rochester Police 
Locust Club, Inc. (Union) that the City violated §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally subcontracted bargaining unit work. In 
particular, the ALT found that the City improperly ceased 
deploying police officers to direct traffic at the City's 
East Main Street construction site and thereafter caused the 
work to be performed by civilian security guards employed by 
a contractor. For the reasons which follow, the ALT decision 
is affirmed. 
Board - U-9665 
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During the summer of 1986, the City began a major 
downtown reconstruction project, which required the closing 
of several blocks of East Main Street to through traffic in 
the downtown area. Although traffic control at construction 
sites in other areas of the City has, as a general matter, 
historically been performed by flaggers employed by 
construction contractors, the City made the determination in 
relation to the East Main Street project that a "police 
presence" was necessary to properly enforce the strict 
limitations on access to the construction area and detour of 
all remaining traffic around the construction site. As a 
result of this determination, for a period of approximately 
13 months, police officers employed by the City's police 
department (and represented by the Union) performed traffic 
control duty on an overtime basis at each end of the 
construction site on East Main Street. At the end of the 13-
month period, the contractor responsible for the second phase 
of the reconstruction work agreed with the City to provide 
personnel who would take the place of the City's police 
officers in conducting traffic control at the East Main 
Street site. The contractor thereupon utilized security 
guards and these security guards, according to uncontroverted 
testimony, dressed in similar fashion to the police officers, 
otherwise appeared to have the same authority as police 
officers, performed the same duties as the police officers, 
116 
Board - U-9665 
-3 
and did not perform flagging duties, although they had been 
requested by the City to do so and had refused. 
Based upon these facts, which are set forth in further 
detail in the ALJ decision at 21 PERB 14541 (1988), the ALT 
found that the at-issue work involves the East Main Street 
construction site and not construction sites around the City 
generally. She concluded that the work at the East Main 
Street site had, from its outset, been determined by the City 
to constitute unit work. The ALJ accordingly found that said 
work, having been from its outset assigned to City police 
officers, and having lasted for a period of 13 months, 
constituted exclusive bargaining unit work which could not be 
subcontracted to nonunit persons without negotiation if the 
level and type of service provided by the subcontract 
employees was essentially the same as the level and type of 
service provided by unit employees. 
It is our determination that the ALJ correctly found 
that the City permitted the same level and type of service 
(i.e. traffic control at the East Main Street construction 
site utilizing a "police presence") to be provided by both 
the police officers and the contractor's security guards. 
She so found on the basis of the similarity in appearance of 
the uniforms and indicia of authority of each group, the 
identity of service provided, and that the City continued to 
receive the services of a police-like presence at the 
JL JL \)i}&> 
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construction site, rather than those of flaggers with reduced 
authority level and duties. 
Thus, the ALJ correctly found that the Union met both 
elements of the test enunciated by this Board to determine 
the negotiability of a unilateral transfer of unit work set 
forth in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB 
53083 (1985) . In that case, we held that in order for a duty 
to bargain to exist, the charging party must establish 
"[w]hether the work had been performed by unit employees 
exclusively [citation omitted] and whether the reassigned 
tasks are substantially similar to those previously performed 
by unit employees. "1/ 
The City, in its exceptions, argues that the ALJ should 
have found that the use of unit members for 13 months at the 
East Main Street construction site was a temporary and 
therefore nonexclusive use, and accordingly subject to the 
Board's holding in Deer Park UFSD. 15 PERB 53104 (1982). In 
Deer Park, however, we relied not on an arbitrary 
establishment of a specific length of time spent performing 
unit work to determine whether it was exclusively unit work, 
but on a determination that the work of teaching had 
historically been work shared and exchanged between two units 
of employees, which rendered the work nonexclusive. We agree 
with the ALJ that it is unnecessary for us to determine 
•3=/Niacrara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB 
53081 at 3182 (1985). 
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whether, by itself, 13 months is a sufficient period of time 
to establish the exclusivity of the unit work, since the 
work, under the facts of this case, had also been exclusively 
unit work from its onset. Obviously, central to our 
determination of whether the work is exclusively unit work is 
a definition of the work itself. We concur with the AKJ that 
the City itself defined the work at issue when it determined 
that the East Main Street construction site was a special 
construction site which warranted and required the use of a 
police presence to enforce traffic limitations in the area. 
While the City was free to change the nature and scope of the 
work to be performed, it was not free to assign or cause to 
be assigned the same work which it had originally defined to 
nonunit personnel, after having initially determined that the 
work was appropriate to the unit of police officers. 
In sum, then, we hold that the proper definition of the 
at-issue work is the screening and rerouting of traffic at 
the East Main Street construction site, that the work as so 
defined had exclusively been performed by police officer 
unit employees because from its onset and for a continuous 
period of 13 months it had been performed by unit employees, 
and that the reassignment of the tasks performed by unit 
employees to civilian security guards required the 
performance of tasks substantially similar to those 
previously performed by unit employees. The standards of 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB ^ [3083 
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(1985), having been met, we affirm the ALJ finding that the 
City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it made such 
reassignment without negotiation with the Union. The 
decision and recommended order of the ALJ are accordingly 
adopted by this Board. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
1. Cease and desist from assigning unit work to 
nonunit personnel; 
2. Restore to the unit that work assigned to the 
security guards at the East Main Street 
construction site; 
3. Pay unit members any lost wages or benefits 
suffered as a result of subcontracting, plus 
interest at the legal rate; 
4. Negotiate in good faith with the Union concerning 
the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
members; 
2/m its exceptions, the City argues that the back pay 
remedy recommended by the ALJ is impossible to perform, 
because it is impossible to determine which police officers 
would have actually performed the overtime work (for which no 
other overtime work was substituted) and it is therefore 
impossible to determine which bargaining unit members would 
be entitled to payment for lost wages or benefits. We 
disagree. The identity of police officers who lost wages or 
benefits as a result of the subcontracting of the at-issue 
work is ascertainable with a reasonable degree of certainty, 
and, in any event, if the parties are unable to agree on this 
issue, a motion may be made by either party to reopen this 
case on the issue of damages before the assigned ALJ. 
ties 
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5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, JNew York 
A-«_, *±r>f 
' ' ' H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemQer 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In order to effectuate tha policies of tha 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Rochester in the unit 
represented by the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc., that the City: 
1. Will not assign unit work to nonunit personnel; 
2. Will restore to the unit that work assigned to security guards 
at the East Main Street construction site; 
3. Will pay unit members any lost wages or benefits suffered as a 
result of subcontracting, plus interest at the legal rate; 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the Union concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment of unit members. 
CITY OF ROCHESTER 
D
"
, e d y
' iBVpwMBtaHws) (TW») 
This Notice must remain posted tor 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and musf nofbe alterec 
defaced, or covered by any other materia}. 1 1 D O # 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS C. BARRY 
CASE NO. DR-004 
Upon a Petition For ...Declaratory . 
Ruling 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This petition comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas C. 
Barry, petitioner, to the refusal of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) to issue a 
declaratory ruling and to the consequent dismissal of his 
petition. Barry, a member of the faculty at the State 
University of New York at Buffalo, seeks a determination that 
§208.3(a) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act)^/ is not applicable to any full- time, tenured or 
•i/section 208.3(a) of the Act provides, in part, as 
follows: 
[E]very employee organization that has been 
recognized or certified as the exclusive 
representative of . . . employees in a 
collective negotiating unit established 
pursuant to this article for the professional 
services in the state university . . . shall 
be entitled to have deducted from the wage or 
salary of the employees in such negotiating 
unit who are not members of said employee 
organization the amount equivalent to the dues 
levied by such employee organization . . . . 
11658 
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tenure track faculty of the State University of New York 
(SUNY), including himself, based upon principles outlined by 
the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University, 444 U.S. 672, 103 LRRM 2526 (1980). In 
particular, Barry asserts that SUNY faculty members are 
professional managers who should be excluded from the 
coverage of the Act. There is no dispute that these persons 
are currently placed in the Professional Services Unit of 
SUNY referenced in §208.3 of the Act. 
The Director's refusal, pursuant to §210.2(a) of the 
Rules of Procedure, to issue a declaratory ruling^/ is based 
upon his finding that §210.1(a) of the Rules, which provides 
that a declaratory ruling petition may be filed for a 
determination as to the "applicability of the act to [the 
petitioner] or any other person, employee organization or 
employer, . . . " does not contemplate its use when the Board 
•^Section 210.2(a) of the Rules provides as follows: 
The Director will determine whether the 
issuance of the declaratory ruling would 
be in the public interest as reflected by 
the policies underlying the act. If his 
determination is in the negative, he 
shall dismiss the petition. Such a 
dismissal shall merely constitute a 
refusal to issue a declaratory ruling, 
and not the denial of any position 
proposed by the petitioner. A decision 
of the Director to refuse to issue a 
declaratory ruling may be made at any 
stage of the proceeding, until a 
declaratory ruling has been made by him 
or by an administrative law judge 
designated by him. 
11659 
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has already decided the issue presented by the petition. The 
Director relies upon a decision of this Board issued in 1969, 
[2 PERB 53070 (1969)] wherein the Board made certain 
determinations concerning SUNY employees, including, in 
particular, a determination that a single statewide unit 
(rather than local units for each college and university of 
the SUNY system) was the most appropriate unit. The issue 
presented by Barry in the instant petition, that full-time 
tenured and tenure track faculty of SUNY are managerial 
personnel who should be excluded from the Act's coverage, was 
not actually litigated in that case because no party to that 
proceeding made such a claim, and coverage was, with certain 
specific "managerial" job title exceptions, generally 
presumed. Accordingly, we find that although implicit in the 
uniting decision cited by the Director is a finding of 
coverage, the Director erred when he refused to decide the 
petition upon the ground that the issue presented has already 
been decided by the Board. 
If the petition is treated as narrowly confined to the 
question of whether §208.3(a) of the Act applies to all 
persons who are in the negotiating unit known as the 
Professional Services Unit of the State University of New 
York, the question presented by the petition would readily be 
answered in the affirmative. There can be no question that 
all persons determined to be members of the Professional 
Services bargaining unit of SUNY are subject to the 
11660 
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provisions of §208.3 of the Act, and Barry makes no claim 
that the language of §2 08.3 is ambiguous or has been 
misapplied to the Professional Services Unit to which he 
belongs and which is represented by United University 
Professions (UUP), which benefits from agency fee shop fee 
deductions made pursuant to that section. 
The gravamen of the petition, however, is, as found by 
the Director, whether full-time tenured and tenure track 
faculty are managerial employees who should be excluded from 
the Act's coverage, based upon the reasoning contained in 
NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 103 LRRM 2526 (1980), Trustees of 
Boston University, 123 LRRM 1144 (1986) (NLRB decision), and 
-\ University of Pittsburgh. 18 PPER 118077 (1987) (an 
Administrative Law Judge [ALT] decision under the 
Pennsylvania Public Employment Relations Act). Each of these 
cases, cited by Barry in support of his petition, is based 
upon a finding that the faculty at the universities under 
consideration are supervisory and/or managerial employees 
excluded from applicable statutory collective bargaining 
coverage. Although Barry, in his exceptions to the 
Director's decision, asserts that the Director misapprehends 
the import of the petition when he treats the petition as 
essentially seeking a managerial designation of all full-time 
tenured and tenure track faculty members of SUNY, no other 
basis for the ruling sought is presented in the petition or 
-J the exceptions filed with this Board. We view the Director's 
1166 
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treatment of the petition as, in essence, seeking a 
managerial designation which would result in exclusion of 
Barry and other similarly situated from the Act•s coverage 
generally, and, therefore, also from the coverage of §208.3 
in particular, as being accurately reflective of the petition 
and its supporting materials and case citations. Thus, a 
second ground explicated by the Director for his refusal to 
issue a declaratory ruling is that, to the extent that the 
basis for Barry's assertion that SUNY faculty members are not 
subject to agency shop fee deductions is that they are 
managerial personnel who are excluded from the Act's 
coverage, the petition seeks a managerial designation, for 
which an entirely separate procedure exists under our 
Rules. 3/ 
We agree with the Director that a petition for 
declaratory ruling is not the appropriate procedure for 
determining whether persons in certain job titles in the 
employ of a public employer are or are not managerial and 
therefore excluded from the Act's coverage. The proper 
procedure for obtaining such a determination is in the 
context of Rules §201.10, which provides for the filing of 
managerial/confidential applications^/. We therefore find 
^/Rules §201.10. 
4/Questions concerning the appropriateness of units and 
the applicability of the Act to employers and employees may 
also arise in the context of representation proceedings 
pursuant to Rules §201. 
116 
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that the Director properly declined to issue a declaratory 
ruling on the issue presented to him, and 
IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
5/ 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Y&^ri*<j*-^-^_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member £ 
§SBarry asserts that certain procedural errors were 
committed in the processing of his declaratory ruling 
petition, such as failure to assign the petition to an ALJ 
other than the ALJ originally assigned to it, excessive time 
taken to reach a decision, failure to request clarifications 
or modifications of Barry, and failure to seek the views of 
other interested parties. We have examined each of these 
exceptions, and find them not to constitute reversible error, 
particularly in light of our affirmance of the Director's 
determination not to issue a declaratory ruling on a matter 
encompassed by other PERB Rules. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WARREN COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-3230 
— a n d -• 
COUNTY OF WARREN, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
WARREN COUNTY LOCAL 857, 
Intervenor. 
DREYER, KINSELLA, BOYAJIAN & TUTTLE, ESQS. (JAMES 
B. TUTTLE, ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL, CSEA LAW 
DEPARTMENT (PAMELA NORRIX-TURNER, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Intervenor 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART, RHODES & JUDGE, ESQS. 
(J. LAWRENCE PALTROWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Warren 
County Police Officers Association (Association) to the 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing the Association's 
petition. The Association seeks to fragment an existing unit 
of all the employees of the Sheriff's Department of the 
11661 
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County of Warren currently represented by the Intervenor, 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Warren County 
Local 857 (CSEA), and to separately represent its deputy 
sheriffs and sergeants assigned to the road patrol and 
investigation divisions. CSEA has filed a response in 
opposition to the exceptions of the Association. The County 
has expressed no preference with regard to the uniting issue. 
The Association bases its request for a separate unit 
for the road patrol deputies on two grounds; first, that 
deputy sheriffs are law enforcement officers functioning in 
the same way as police officers, and that the deputies 
assigned as correction officers in the jail and as 
\ communication operators do not perform similar law 
enforcement responsibilities, resulting in an inherent 
conflict of interest; second, that these divergent interest 
have led to and created conflicts in negotiations and 
inadequate representation in the handling of grievances. 
FACTS 
Having reviewed the record, we adopt in full the 
findings of fact made by the Director in his decision below. 
In brief, the Sheriff's Department is divided into several 
operating divisions: road patrol, which also incorporates 
investigation and civil, correction (jail) and communication. 
Forty-three employees are assigned to road patrol; 2 0 full-
time and 5 part-time employees to correction; and 11 
employees, all communication operators, to the communication 
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division. All of these, except for clericals and cooks, have 
been deputed by the Sheriff and are in the classified civil 
service. They are all subject to common personnel practices 
and procedures and most of the benefits provided by the 
existing contract. 
While all must pass a physical examination in order to 
be employed, the road patrol deputies must pass an agility 
test for employment. The latter must also undergo several 
hundred hours of State-mandated training, including firearm 
training. They perform traditional police work throughout 
the County and have responsibility for preventing crime, 
enforcing laws and ordinances and maintaining the peace. On 
occasion, road patrol deputies are called upon to assist at 
the jail. They also are assigned to transport prisoners to 
court, to hospitals and to other facilities. The correction 
officers work primarily in the jail and are not assigned to 
road patrol duties. They undergo substantially fewer hours 
of job training, and are not required to take firearm 
training unless they want to be eligible for prisoner 
transport assignments. The communication operators answer 
emergency calls and calls for assistance, dispatch vehicles 
and transfer calls. Firearm training is available to them 
should they choose to make themselves available for prisoner 
transport. 
As to the quality of the representation afforded to the 
road patrol deputies, the Director's decision fully sets 
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forth the incidents and experiences relied upon by the 
Association to support its claim of inadequate representation 
and conflicts in negotiations. In brief, in several recent 
contract negotiations, a demand for pay equity for the 
correction officers with the deputies has been a "stumbling 
block" in negotiations. On another occasion, a safety 
proposal sought by the road patrol deputies was dropped in 
favor of a larger salary increase for the entire unit. In 
addition, testimony was received regarding the handling by 
CSEA of several grievances of certain road patrol deputies. 
DIRECTOR'S DECISION 
With regard to the Association's claim of an inherent 
conflict of interest between the law enforcement functions of 
the road patrol deputies and the functions of the correction 
officers and communication operators, the Director concluded 
that "there is no real factual basis" distinguishing this 
case from our decision in County of Albany and Albany County 
Sheriff, 19 PERB [^3054 (1986) , and that our decision in that 
case is dispositive of the Association's argument. As to the 
Association's claim of negotiations conflict and inadequate 
representation, the Director concluded that the record does 
not establish such conflict or inadequate representation as 
to warrant the fragmentation of this long-standing 
unit, nor establish that the road patrol deputies, as a 
distinct group, have received disparate treatment. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Association urges us either to distinguish County of 
Albany and Albany County Sheriff, supra, on the facts or to 
reconsider and overrule that decision. The Association 
argues that, in this case, the road patrol, jail and 
communication functions are entirely separate administrative 
departments and there is essentially no overlap or crossover 
in job functions, while in the Albany case, there was proof 
of a clear overlap in functions. The Association also argues 
that road patrol deputies should be viewed by us as no 
different than other police officers and should be accorded 
the same separate units as we have granted to police 
"\ officers. The Association also claims that the evidence 
herein establishes a conflict between the interests of the 
road patrol deputies and all other members of the existing 
unit, both in collective bargaining matters and in grievance 
administration. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association urges us to find that the law 
enforcement duties of the road patrol deputies warrant a 
separate bargaining unit for these employees. We have 
previously considered and rejected the claim that there is an 
inherent conflict of interest between the responsibilities of 
road patrol deputies and correction officers in a sheriff's 
department warranting fragmentation of an overall unit of 
sheriff's department employees. Rather, we have recognized 
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that the common "law enforcement" responsibilities of deputy 
sheriffs and correction officers, by whatever title, warrant 
a single unit for both. 1/ 
We have also previously held that, primarily because of 
the existence of a joint employer, sheriff's department 
employees should most appropriately be fragmented from all 
other employees of a county.-2/ in so holding, we also 
: accorded considerable weight to the fact that the work of 
most of the employees of a sheriff's department primarily 
involves law enforcement, thus distinguishing such employees 
from other county employees. 
Our decisions also reflect an almost uniform practice of 
.•"A establishing separate bargaining units for police officers 
who are members of a municipality's organized police 
department rather than maintaining them in units with other 
employees who do not have law enforcement responsibilities. 
In Village of Skaneateles, 16 PERB 53070 (1983), we indicated 
at least three reasons for this treatment of such police 
officers: 1) the special and unique police community of 
interest deriving from their law enforcement duties and 
^/county of Albany and Albany County Sheriff, supra; Albany 
County and Albany County Sheriff's Department, 15 PERB 53008 
(1982) ; County of Schenectady and Sheriff, 14 PERB 53 013 
(1981) ; County of Rockland, 11 PERB 53050 (1978). 
^/county of Orange and the Sheriff of the County of Orange, 
14 PERB 53012 (1981); County of Schenectady and Sheriff, 
supra; County of Montgomery and the Montgomery County 
, Sheriff. 12 PERB 53126 (1979). 
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hazards attendant thereto; 2) the compatibility of such 
separate unit with the joint responsibilities of the public 
employer and public employees to serve the public, the 
primary commitment of law enforcement being part and parcel 
of the employer's fundamental mission to preserve public 
order; and 3) the separate impasse procedures under Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §209.4, which can create pitfalls to stable 
labor relations for a combined police and nonpolice unit. 
As we indicated in Skaneateles, the special and unique 
community of interest derived from law enforcement duties is 
not the only reason for finding a separate unit of police 
officers to be most appropriate. In all of the cited cases, 
the police officers would otherwise be continued in units 
with employees with no law enforcement duties. When dealing 
with a sheriff's department, however, we deal with road 
patrol deputies, correction officers and communication 
operators who share a common law enforcement responsibility 
with their employer. All are part and parcel of the 
sheriff's fundamental mission to preserve public order. In 
this regard, we note that the evidence herein of overlap of 
functions is not significantly different than that found in 
County of Albany and Albany County Sheriff,, supra. 
Of considerable significance, also, the road patrol 
deputy sheriffs and the jail and communication,division 
deputy sheriffs are subject to the same impasse procedures 
under CSL §209.3. Unlike police officers who are members of 
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an organized police department, the road patrol deputy 
sheriffs are not subject to the impasse procedures, including 
interest arbitration, provided under CSL §209.4. 
For these reasons, we continue to believe that the "law 
enforcement" responsibilities and duties of road patrol 
deputies and non-road patrol deputies are of sufficient 
common interest to warrant a single unit for both. There are 
sufficient differences between the relationship of police 
officers who are members of a municipality's organized police 
department to other employees and the relationship of road 
patrol deputy sheriffs to other deputies employed in a 
sheriff's department to warrant the conclusion that the road 
patrol's law enforcement duties do not alone justify 
according them a separate bargaining unit. 
Having reviewed the record, we also affirm the 
Director's conclusion that the Association has not 
established a disparity in the quality of representation 
furnished to road patrol deputies by CSEA. There has been no 
showing of a deliberate organizational strategy to afford 
road patrol deputy sheriffs a lower quality of representation 
nor has there been a showing that they have not received 
meaningful and effective representation in negotiations. 
Indeed, the record shows that the road patrol deputies 
comprise a majority of the unit, a road patrol deputy is the 
president of the CSEA unit, and these deputies 
11671 
Board - C-3230 
-9 
have greater representation on the negotiating team than the 
other members of the unit. Under these circumstances, we 
cannot find that the negotiating results complained of by the 
Association represent a deliberate sacrifice of the interests 
of the road patrol deputies. The claim of inadequate 
representation of grievances involves, at best, the merit of 
the judgments made by the president, who is himself a road 
patrol deputy. In short, there is no showing on this record 
that the road patrol deputies, as a distinct group, are 
receiving disparate treatment. In the absence of such 
evidence, there is no basis to fragment this long-standing 
unit. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
1:1672 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 83 0, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS.U—8997 
-and- and U-9025 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
Respondent. 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ. (LOUIS D. STOBER, ESQ, of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, DE ANGELIS & EISMAN, ESQS. (by PETER A. BEE, 
ESQ.), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both Civil 
Service Employees Association, Local 830, AFSCME, Local 1000, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) and the County of Nassau (County) to the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dismissing in 
part, and sustaining in part, two charges and an amendment 
filed by CSEA on October 15 and 28, 1986 and January 16, 
1987, respectively.. Each charge alleged that the County 
violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally transferring bargaining 
unit work to nonunit employees. The matters were 
consolidated for hearing. 
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The County provides advance emergency medical assistance 
through its Emergency Ambulance Bureau, a branch of its 
Police Department. The County employs in the Bureau both 
bargaining unit civilians and nonunit police officers as 
Ambulance Medicalr Technicians (AMTs).There is no functional 
difference between the medical duties of police officer AMTs 
(P-AMTs) and civilian AMTs (C-AMTs); both provide emergency 
medical assistance using the County's ambulances. However, 
the C-AMTs are assigned to stationary locations from which 
they are dispatched to the situs of need, while the P-AMTs 
patrol County roads in ambulances from which they also 
perform routine law enforcement services as well as providing 
emergency medical assistance. 
The County also has utilized C-AMTs to staff its 
Emergency Medical Control Center, located in one of its 
hospitals. The tasks performed by the C-AMTs include the 
staffing of radios with which emergency medical information 
is exchanged between the AMTs providing medical assistance 
and the doctors at the hospital, and maintaining the radio 
telemetry records, called the "blotter". In addition, since 
the early 1980s, the C-AMTs have served as "custodians" of a 
gun locker housed in the Center. 
Each of the assignments of personnel in the Emergency 
Ambulance Bureau has been designated as a "post". Thus, for 
example, within each of the County's 9 geographic precincts, 
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there are 2 posts, 1 at a fixed location at which 1 C-AMT is 
assigned, and 1 on patrol assigned to a P-AMT. Each post is 
identified by a different post number. There is also a 
designated post number for the assignment at the Emergency 
Control Center, the duties of which include maintenance of 
the "blotter" and custody of the gun locker. 
When, through attrition, vacancies appeared in the C-AMT 
force, the County assigned 2 P-AMTs to patrol certain 
precincts during 4 shifts which had previously been manned by 
1 P-AMT and 1 C-AMT. Additionally, the County assigned P-
AMTs to the Emergency Medical Control Center post, which was 
responsible for the maintenance of the blotter and the gun 
locker. 
In regard to each of these functions, CSEA asserts that 
the County unilaterally assigned P-AMTs to posts that had 
previously been assigned on a permanent basis to C-AMTs, in 
violation of the Act. 
The ALJ found that CSEA failed to establish that 
emergency medical assistance has been exclusive unit work. 
He rejected CSEA's claim that the County's post numbers 
defined discrete work boundaries. He dismissed CSEA's charge 
relating to such work. 
The ALJ also found, however, that CSEA had established 
i 
that the record-keeping duties relating to the maintenance of 
the blotter and the duties involving the custody of the gun 
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locker were exclusively performed by C-AMTs prior to the 
County's unilateral transfer of such duties to P-AMTs. He 
found that the County failed to offer any explanation for the 
transfer of the record-keeping duties to the P-AMTs. 
Accordingly, he determined that the County violated 
§§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act when it transferred such unit 
work to the nonunit personnel. 
As to the transfer of the gun locker responsibilities, 
the ALT noted that such transfer was based on the belief of 
the commanding officer of the Emergency Ambulance Bureau that 
it was "illegal" to assign such responsibilities to a 
civilian. He found this to be a good faith belief warranting 
dismissal of the alleged violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ found no statutory support for the 
belief and concluded that the impact of the transfer on unit 
work outweighed the speculative basis for assigning such work 
to P-AMTs. Accordingly, he determined that the County 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally assigned 
nonunit P-AMTs to perform the work of maintaining "custody" 
of the gun locker, the same job exclusively performed by unit 
C-AMTs. 
The ALJ dismissed as untimely the January 16, 1987 
amendment, since it complained of one of the assignments made 
more than four months before the filing of the amendment. 
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In its exceptions, CSEA challenges the ALJ's dismissal 
regarding the assignment of P-AMTs to emergency medical 
assistance posts formerly assigned to C-AMTs. CSEA asserts 
that these posts constitute separate work boundaries clearly 
defined by the post numbers^. CSEA' sposition is that certain 
post numbers identify stationary posts which have always been 
permanently assigned only to C-AMTs. CSEA also excepts to 
the ALJ's dismissal of its January 16, 1987 amendment on the 
ground that such dismissal is not authorized by our Rules 
since the County never raised the issue of timeliness in its 
answer or at the hearing. 
The County * s exceptions relate only to the ALJ's 
determination with regard to the transfer of gun locker 
duties.-3=/ The County argues that a decision was made to 
change the qualifications for the job. It relies on Penal 
Law §265.01 as support for the contention that only police 
officers may legally have "custodial possession" of the gun 
locker. It urges that its determination that police officers 
are better qualified for this job than C-AMTs should outweigh 
any impact on CSEA's negotiating unit. 
DISCUSSION 
We have previously held that, with respect to the 
unilateral transfer of unit work, the initial essential 
•3=/The County has not excepted to the ALJ's determination 
i regarding the transfer of the record-keeping duties relating 
to the maintenance of the "blotter". 
11677 
Board - U-8997 and U-9025 -6 
questions are whether the work had been performed by unit 
employees exclusively and whether the reassigned tasks are 
substantially similar to those previously performed by unit 
employees.-2/ In determining whether the duties at issue have 
been performed exclusively by unit employees, we have 
indicated that the charging party must establish a 
discernable boundary to the claimed unit work which would 
appropriately set it apart from work done by nonunit 
personnel. 
3/ 
We affirm the ALJ's conclusion that CSEA has failed to 
establish that the County improperly transferred exclusive 
unit work when it assigned P-AMTs to post numbers previously 
assigned to C-AMTs to carry out emergency medical assistance 
duties. CSEA's focus on the post numbers by which the County 
identifies the newly-assigned posts cannot be accepted as 
defining the distinction, if any, between unit work of C-AMTs 
and the work of P-AMTs. It is clear that if there is any 
distinction between the two groups of AMTs, it is that C-AMTs 
remain at stationary locations while P-AMTs are always on 
patrol, performing both ambulance and law enforcement 
^/Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 18 PERB f3 083 
(1985). 
found such a discernable boundary in Town of West 
Seneca, 19 PERB 53028 (1986). We found no discernable 
boundary of exclusivity in Indian River School Unit, CSEA, 
20 PERB U[3047 (1987) . See also Otselic Vallev CSD. 
19 PERB 3065 (1986); Guilderland CSD. 16 PERB 3038 (1983). 
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services. It is not the post number which determines whether 
stationary or mobile services are to be provided, but whether 
a C-AMT or P-AMT is utilized* When a P-AMT is assigned a 
post number formerly assigned to a C-AMT, the P-AMT is 
required to be on patrol. The post numbers are merely 
convenient administrative designations intended to identify 
the location of individual C-AMTs and P-AMTs. We agree with 
the ALJ that the post numbers do not define a discernable 
boundary which would set apart the work performed by C-AMTs 
from the work performed by P-AMTs. Inasmuch as there is no 
functional difference between the medical duties of C-AMTs 
and P-AMTs, we affirm the dismissal of CSEA's allegations in 
7
 this regard. 
This record does, however, establish that additional 
duties can be, and have been, assigned exclusively to C-AMTs. 
One such duty involved the custody of the gun locker at the 
Emergency Medical Control Center. Before police officers may 
enter the hospital, they are required to secure their weapons 
in lockers. The "custodian" gives a key to the police 
officer, who places the gun in the locker and retains the 
key. The "custodian" is responsible for the security of the 
gun locker room and the guns in the lockers but does not at 
any time have direct access to the guns. This custodial 
responsibility has been performed exclusively by C-AMTs since 
j the early 1980s. 
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The County admittedly transferred this responsibility to 
nonunit police officers. Its principal defense to the charge 
is that a decision was made to change the employment 
qualifications necessary to perform this duty when the 
commanding officer of the Emergency Ambulance Bureau 
concluded that only police officers could "legally" perform 
the job. The County relies on Penal Law §265.01, which makes 
it a crime to "possess" a weapon, in support of its claim of 
i 
illegality. The commanding officer's opinion, however, is 
not sufficient to establish that the C-AMTs* temporary 
responsibility for the custody of the guns in the locker 
while performing their assigned duties as employees of the 
Police Department would be found to be a crime. Apart from 
its speculative claim of illegality, the County merely 
asserts that police officers are better qualified than C-AMTs 
to perform the gun locker duty. In light of the fact that 
C-AMTs were assigned sole responsibility for this job for 
several years, without any evidence of inadequate 
performance,-^/ we conclude that the County's asserted 
interest in the qualifications for the job does not outweigh 
the impact on CSEA's negotiating unit occasioned by this 
transfer of work. 
Vsee Town of Brookhaven, 17 PERB 53087.. (1984) ; West 
Hempstead UFSD. 14 PERB f3096 (1981). 
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Finally, we conclude that the dismissal of CSEA's 
amendment of January 16, 1987 on the grounds of timeliness 
was properly made pursuant to our Rules. Section 204.7(1) of 
our Rules authorizes the dismissal of a charge on the ALJ's 
own initiative on the ground that the alleged violation 
occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the 
charge if the failure of timeliness "was first revealed 
during the hearing," CSEA does not question that the 
evidence produced at the hearing revealed that the action 
alleged in the amendment took place more than four months 
before the filing of the amendment. 
Accordingly, we find that the County violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act by assigning nonunit P-AMTs to perform 
i 
the gun locker responsibilities previously exclusively 
performed by unit C-AMTs. 
By reason of the foregoing, the County is hereby ordered 
to: 
1. Restore to CSEA unit members the 
record-keeping and gun locker 
responsibilities at the Emergency Medical 
Control Center which had been assigned to 
P-AMTs; 
2. Cease and desist from coercing, 
restraining or interfering with unit 
employees in the exercise of activities 
protected by the Act; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA 
concerning unit members' terms and 
conditions of employment; and, 
) 
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4. Sign and post the attached notice 
at all locations customarily used to post 
notices to unit employees. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemberX 
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APPENDIX 
NICE 10 ML EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
w» hereby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Local 830. AFSCME. Local 1000. 
AFL-CIO. that the County of Nassau: 
1. Will restore to CSEA unit members the 
record-keeping and gun locker responsibilities at 
the Emergency Medical Control Center which had 
been assigned to police officer Emergency 
Ambulance Medical Technicians. 
2. Will not coerce, restrain or interfere 
with unit employees in the exercise of activities 
protected by the Public Employees' Fair Employ-
ment Act; 
3. Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA 
concerning unit members' terms and conditions of 
employment. 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
Dated By 
(RaprtMntativt) (Till*) 
This Notice must remain posted tor 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altert 
defaced, or covered by any other material. -i A fJfiQ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNATEGO NON-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL NO. 3895, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9627 
UNATEGO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQS. (EDWARD J. SARZYNSKI, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Unatego Central School District (District) excepts to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision which finds that the 
District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally adopted an "Unpaid 
Leave of Absence" policy and altered its existing unpaid leave 
practice. The District does not deny that the written policy 
promulgated on April 29, 1987, to be effective July 1, 1987, was 
not negotiated with the Unatego Non-Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, Local No. 3895 (Association), but asserts that the 
written policy so promulgated merely constitutes a codification 
of existing practice with respect to unpaid leaves of absence. 
The District further argues in its exceptions that establishment 
of an unpaid leave of absence policy does not constitute a 
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violation unless the evidence establishes that the policy alters 
or abolishes leave time. [See Waverly CSD, 20 PERB }[4569, affd, 
20 PERB 53061 (1988)]. The third exception of the District 
alleges that §92 of the General Municipal Law gives to the 
governing board of each school district the right to grant leaves 
of absence to its employees, with or without pay, and to "adopt 
rules and regulations in relation thereto," giving to the 
District, absent a waiver by it, the unfettered right to 
promulgate procedures without negotiation. 
For the reasons which follow, the District's exceptions are 
denied, and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
In a related case, issued simultaneously with this Decision 
and Order, this Board holds that the District violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Act as against another employee organization by 
promulgating the policy at issue in the instant case. We there 
find that not only the procedures for requesting leave, but the 
criteria for the determination of whether leave would be granted, 
were modified by promulgation of the written policy. For the 
reasons set forth in that decision, and based upon the evidence 
adduced at the hearing before the ALJ in the instant case, we 
find that the written policy promulgated by the District on April 
29, 1987 did not constitute a mere codification of the previously 
existing practice, but made changes in violation.of §209-a.l(d) 
•3=/s_ee Unatecro CSD, 21 PERB ^3039 (decided August 3, 1988). 
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of the Act^/ by unilaterally making changes in the procedure and 
criteria for granting leaves. The first two exceptions of the 
District are, for these reasons, denied. 
The District's third exception appears to assert that §92 of 
the General Municipal Law confers a right to implement 
unilaterally procedures and policies concerning, specifically, 
the granting of leaves of absence with or without pay, 
notwithstanding the provisions of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, which 
it is our duty to administer and enforce. We have held in other 
cases that in the absence of an expression of specific 
legislative intent to take a matter which would otherwise 
constitute a term and condition of employment outside the scope 
of collective bargaining, the duty to bargain will be construed 
consistently with the right of an employer to exercise discretion 
conferred by statute, in order to give both statutes their proper 
effect.-3-/ There is no evidence here which would support a 
finding that §92 of the General Municipal Law is intended to, or 
does, take the issue of unpaid leaves of absence outside the 
scope of bargaining under the Act, or that it shifts the burden 
of the District to the Association to obtain a waiver of the 
right to bargain leave of absence procedures. 
2/see Spencerport CSD, 16 PERB f3074 (1983); City of 
Albany. 7 PERB H[3078 (1974) ; Plainedae UFSD. 7 PERB ^ [3050 
(1974) . 
•Vsee, e.g. , Elmira CSD, 20 PERB ^3054 (1987) (appeal pending) ; 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New 
York, 19 PERB f3015 (1986), and cases cited therein. 
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Based upon the foregoing and upon our holdings in Unatego 
CSD, supra. decided simultaneously herewith, we find that the 
District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
promulgated, on April 29, 1987, and implemented on July 1, 1987, 
an unpaid leave of absence policy. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the unpaid leave of absence policy adopted by 
the Board of Education on April 29, 1987, as it affects 
employees in the unit represented by the Unatego Non-
Teachers Association; 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the Unatego Non-Teachers 
Association with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees; and 
3. Post a notice in the form attached in all locations 
ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
"rfarold R. Newman,^Chairma n 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membei 
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PURSUANT TO 
THH DECISION AWO ORDER OF THE 
YORK STAT 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELAT 
and in order to effectuate the policies oi Jh« 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
W 9 hwebv notifya-^  e mPl°y e e s i n t h e unit represented by the Unatego 
Non-Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 3895, that the 
Unatego Central School District: 
1.. Will rescind the unpaid leave of absence 
policy adopted by the Board of Education on 
April 29, 1987, as it affects employees in the 
unit represented by the Unatego Non-Teachers 
Association, and 
2. Will negotiate in good faith with 
Unatego Non-Teachers Association with respect to 
terjns and conditions of employmemt of unit 
employees," 
UNATEGO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Titl«) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS1 ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
COUNTY OF MONROE and MONROE COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Monroe County Deputy 
Sheriffs' Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and" described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-3408 
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Unit: Included: All deputized personnel up to and including 
Sergeant Investigator, in the following titles: 
Deputy Sheriff Jailor 
Deputy Sheriff Jailor Corporal 
Deputy Sheriff Jailor Sergeant 
Deputy Sheriff Patrol 
Deputy Sheriff Corporal Headquarters 
Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Patrol 
Deputy sheriff Investigator 
Deputy Sheriff Sergeant Investigator 
Deputy Sheriff Court Security Supervisor 
Deputy Sheriff Assistant Court Security Supervisor 
Deputy Sheriff Senior Court Security 
Deputy Sheriff Civil 
Deputy Sheriff Assistant Supervisor - Civil 
Deputy Sheriff Court Security 
Excluded: Deputy Sheriff Lieutenant and higher titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Monroe County Deputy 
Sheriffs1 Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
^j^uUfP JC NOL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
4^fc_ SrC 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
-" PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORLEANS-NIAGARA BOCES ASSOCIATION OF 
RELATED SERVICE PROFESSIONALS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3377 
ORLEANS-NIAGARA BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Orleans-Niagara BOCES 
Association of Related Service Professionals has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time 
physical therapists (RPT - licensed and 
registered), occupational therapists (OTR/L -, 
licensed and registered), certified 
occupational therapy assistants (COTA) and 
physical therapy assistants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Orleans-Niagara BOCES 
Association of Related Service Professionals. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
^i^-eJ.B d> 'jUstykS^lt 
Haro ld R. Newman, Chairman 
VULJLtez- ^ - £**><<* <C ^ Vc- t^r 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Member^" 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GEORGE RODAK, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE JNO. C-3 39 0 
JORDAN ELBRIDGE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
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purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time bus drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees, casual and substitute 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer^ 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME/AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
"**7^  
Walter L. Eisenberg, MembeS. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3303 
TOWN OF NEW PALTZ, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW PALTZ POLICE DEPARTMENT LOCAL SECURITY 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the New Paltz Emergency 
Communications Center in the title of 
Dispatcher. 
Excluded: Chief Dispatcher. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newm 
&>trrKP~T^^ 
an, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemberX 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 887, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS 
OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3398 
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
- and -
NUCLEAR SECURITY OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 887, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
J 
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v 
"- ' agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles: 
Watchperson, Nuclear Security Officer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 887, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
J any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 3, 1988 
Albany, New York 
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Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member*. 
